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Forecasting and Explaining Aggregate Consumer Credit Delinquency Behaviour 
1.  Introduction 
The recent rise in consumer loan defaults and mortgage defaults in the US and in 
Europe has emphasised the significance of accurate credit risk modelling and the 
interdependence between the banking sector and the real economy. The recent crisis 
had many causes but amongst them was the increase in default rates of sub-prime 
mortgage loans in the US. A contributing factor was the rapid extension of loans to 
high risk borrowers whose ability to repay was highly dependent on the state of the 
macroeconomy. When house price inflation began to fall and interest rates, fuel prices 
and eventually unemployment increased many of these borrowers defaulted (Crouhy 
et al: 2008, Arner: 2009). Although this considerable rise in default rates has occurred 
only since 2006, there are good reasons to believe that the state of the macroeconomy 
has more long run effects on the proportion of borrowers that default in any one year. 
It is important for lenders to be able to explain and to predict aggregate consumer 
delinquency over time. An increase in total consumer delinquency, ceteris paribus 
may increase the need to increase interest rate margins to compensate for increased 
risk and also to retain sufficient liquidity.  A significant increase in delinquencies may 
cause lenders with low capital adequacy ratios to become insolvent causing 
widespread failures by contagion.  The Basel II Accord (BIS 2006) allows banks to 
determine their own capital requirements by using their own models to forecast future 
probabilities of default. These probabilities must be ‘through the cycle’ (probabilities 
that do not vary with the business cycle) and a common method of obtaining these is 
to use a technique that involves modelling default rates in terms of macroeconomic 
variables (see Heitfield: 2005). 
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In this paper we model aggregate consumer default rates in the US over a twenty year 
period including the period of their recent escalation. We do this for consumer loans 
and for mortgages separately. We use a cointegration technique to explain long run 
relationships between default rates and the macroeconomy and we model changes in 
defaults rates in terms of deviations from the long run relationship and short-run 
changes in the macroeconomy. We also compare the predictive performance of these 
models with ARIMA models to see which methodology would give more accurate   
forecasts using the especially challenging task of forecasting recent events. We find 
evidence to support the existence of long run ‘equilibrium’ relationships between the 
level of interest rates and the level of debt outstanding on the one hand and aggregate 
default rates on the other, but surprisingly not between the level of house prices and 
the level of default rates. But we do find that changes in house prices significantly 
affect changes in default rates as do changes in disposable income, unemployment, 
consumer confidence, and interest rates. We also find that both forecasting 
methodologies gave highly accurate forecasts of default rates and were about equally 
accurate. Had these models been known in mid 2008 subsequent rises in default rates 
could have been accurately forecast. We make two contributions. We offer the first 
model of aggregate consumer default rates for the US using co integration techniques 
and so to separate long run ‘equilibrium’ relationships from short run dynamic 
relationships. Second we show a comparison of the forecasting performance between 
this econometric technique and ARIMA. To our knowledge this has not been done 
before. 
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The next section of the paper reviews the related literature and subsequently we 
explain our model. In view of the especially high interest in mortgage defaults we 
present our results for these sectors in separate sections. The final section concludes. 
 
2.  Related Studies 
The literature suggests there are essentially three explanations as to why a borrower 
defaults on a loan.   First, a borrower may manage his/her finances poorly due to 
hyperbolic discounting leading to a preference for ‘irrational’ immediate expenditure 
(Liabson et al: 2003). Second an ‘ability to pay’ hypothesis that a borrower will fail to 
pay on time when an income or expenditure shock occurs that was not expected at the 
time the loan was taken out.  The causes of such shocks include unpredicted loss of 
job, marital breakdown, family bereavement, health problems, increases in interest 
payments on loans, and so on.  Thirdly, the ‘strategic default hypothesis’ whereby 
when a loan is used to buy a real asset (for example a house), and if the capital market 
is perfect with no transactions costs or reputation effects, a borrower would increase 
his wealth if he defaulted on a loan when the value of it was greater than the value of 
the asset (Kau et al 1994)1.  When considering aggregate default rates over time in the 
United States specifically, several explanations have been advanced.  Observing the 
increase in credit card delinquency rates between 1994 and 1997 Gross and Souleles 
(2002) propose two explanations.  First that the proportion of borrowers that were of 
high risk increased and it has been these borrowers who defaulted.  Second, that 
borrowers ‘have become more willing to default’, given their risk characteristics, 
because the social stigma of default and associated loss of future credit supply have 
declined. 
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Previous empirical studies that have related the delinquency of credit card debt and of 
mortgages to macroeconomic variables have used either duration models or time 
series models.  We start with duration models for credit cards. All three studies of 
which we are aware estimate account level duration models with macroeconomic 
variables as time varying co-variates. Gross and Souleles, op cit, used a panel of over 
200,000 credit card borrowers.  Surprisingly they found that the unemployment rate in 
the county of residence, the per capita income and house prices in the region were not 
significantly related to delinquency, and together with measures of borrower risk they 
could only explain a small proportion of changing delinquency rates over time.  The 
residual was tentatively ascribed to the trend of reduced stigma.  However, FCIC data 
suggests that if the period under consideration is extended to between 1992 and 2006, 
the delinquency rate on credit card debt was, if anything, trended downwards and the 
same was true of total consumer debt.  Agarwal and Liu (2003) also use panel data for 
credit card holders for 1995-2001.  They found the probability of a credit card holder 
missing three consecutive payments in a particular period, given the card holder’s 
predicted level of risk, was increased if the lagged unemployment rate in the county 
or state of residence was higher, but that the change in the unemployment rate had no 
effect.  Account balance three months earlier also positively affected the hazard rate. 
Bellotti and Crook (2009) estimated a proportional hazards model for a sample of 
credit cards issued by a UK bank between 1997 and 2001 and found that the base 
interest rate, real earnings, production and house prices significantly all affected the 
hazard rate. 
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Turning to account level panel models of duration for mortgage debt delinquency, 
Lambrecht et al (1997) used a survival model applied to 5272 borrowers in the UK to 
find evidence more in favour of the ability to pay argument than the strategic default 
hypothesis.  But none of the variables they included varied over time.  Deng (et al 
2000) estimated a competing risks model of prepayment and default, for mortgages 
granted between 1976 and 1983, to investigate the extent to which the hazard rate can 
be explained by the strategic default hypothesis.  For default to be optimal in the 
presence of transactions costs the put option must be in the money and trigger events 
like divorce or unexpected unemployment must occur.  The time varying annual 
divorce rate and quarterly unemployment rate in the State of residence were both 
found to significantly affect the probability of default, as was the probability the put 
option was in the money.  Teo (2004) used a sample of mortgage loans in Singapore 
to test an eclectic range of hypothesised determinants of the hazard rate.  He found 
that whilst neither characteristics of the property bought, nor of the borrower, 
explained the rate, those of the mortgage and of the macroeconomy did.  Teo’s 
evidence may be interpreted as supporting both the ability to pay and strategic default 
hypotheses. However, Teo’s study is limited by a small sample size (657 cases) and 
by collinearity. 
 
Whilst account level duration models account for borrower specific characteristics, 
with the exception possibly of Bellotti and Crook (2009), these studies model 
delinquency over relatively short periods of time and they do not cover an entire 
business cycle.  It is therefore questionable whether there is sufficient variation in the 
macroeconomic variables over time to accurately estimate their effect.  Further, these 
studies have not considered the autocorrelation properties of their model residuals. 
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In contrast a small number of time series studies have considered data on aggregate 
default rates which, whilst they omit borrower specific characteristics, they do cover 
much longer periods.  One of the earliest studies is by Sullivan (1987).  She used data 
from 1975 to 1986 to find evidence in support of the ability to pay hypothesis and that 
the willingness of banks to lend affected default rates. But Sullivan did not consider 
some important factors which one would expect to be important in the explanation of 
delinquency rates, for example the level of interest rates, and there is evidence her 
empirical model may be misspecified.  Grieb et al (2001) empirically modelled bank 
card delinquency rates over 1981 to 1999.  They found these were explained by debt 
to income ratios, which were taken to represent capacity to pay, with no evidence 
supporting the ideas that delinquency was due to job market conditions, high interest 
rates or high credit supply.  They do, however, find evidence that borrowers defaulted 
on credit card debt before other types of consumer debt.  However, the empirical 
model in their study has low explanatory power and omits the possibility that an error 
correction mechanism may be estimated and may be more informative than the model 
chosen. 
 
Two papers use error correction models to model mortgage delinquency. They use 
data for the UK and England and Wales respectively. Whitley et al (2004) found the 
proportion of mortgage loans which are at least six months in arrears is related to 
mortgage income gearing, unemployment, and loan to value ratio for first time 
buyers.  However, the lack of regression diagnostics, the imputation of quarterly data 
from semi-annual data, and a lack of explanation of the structure of their model limits 
the usefulness of these results. Figuera et al (2005) use quarterly data for 1993-2001 
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and find that the proportion of loans that are three months overdue is related to the 
unemployment rate, loan to income ratio for first time buyers, unwithdrawn equity 
and the debt service ratio. 
 
Clearly explanations of why some individuals default and others do not may explain 
aggregate default rates. For example, if there is an increase in the incidence of 
catastrophic net income shocks or irrational borrowing or negative equity, then one 
would expect an increase in aggregate default rates. 
 
Overall the literature suggests that variations over time in aggregate delinquency rates 
for unsecured credit are due to variations in the ability of the average borrower to 
make repayments and to variations in the risk distribution of borrowers due to bank 
lending policies.  For secured lending one can add variations in the values of real 
assets relative to debt outstanding on them.  But apart from Bellotti and Crook (op 
cit), none of these papers test the forecasting ability of their models and none of the 
studies of US default rates give a thorough treatment of the time series properties of 
their data. We now turn to observed patterns in US household delinquency. 
 
3.  Patterns in Delinquency and Charge offs 
Figure 1 plots delinquency and charge off rates as a percentage of debt outstanding2 
for all consumer loans and mortgages extended by all US commercial banks from 
1987 until 2009. During this period the trend in charge off rates is distinctly upwards 
whereas until 2006 that of 30+ days delinquency is slightly downwards. This suggests 
that until 2006 the average period of time which was taken before a delinquent loan 
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was charged off was shortened, especially in the period 1997-2002. The values in 
2002 Q1 where the charge off rate slightly exceeds the delinquency rate is probably 
due to a slightly different method of calculating the two rates and possibly different 
methods of applying seasonal adjustment3. The sudden rise from 2006 is readily 
apparent. We construct a model to explain these patterns of aggregate delinquency in 
section 4. 
Figure 1 Here 
The delinquency rates for all consumer loans in Figure 1 mask different patterns in the 
rates for different types of loans.  Note that consumer loans consist of credit card 
loans plus other consumer loans, residential real estate loans are separate.  The trend 
for all three types of loans was downward from 1992 to 2006 (2005 for real estate 
loans) and rose rapidly after that. But the delinquency rate for real estate loans 
appears to have been little affected by the business cycle trough in late 1994 whilst 
the rate for consumer loans was substantially affected and credit card loans especially 
so.  Perhaps surprisingly the consumer loans seem positively correlated in the mid 
1990s.  That is as real disposable income declined to 1995 Q4 and rose thereafter, 
default rates on consumer loans declined as well though they stopped mirroring 
income from about mid 1997.  One possible explanation for this is that as the level of 
income falls so does the demand for debt and so the less credit worthy find that 
repayments relative to income decline and they are less likely to miss a payment or 
possibly to stay overdue.  If there is a critical level of debt outstanding above which 
there are a disproportionate number of defaulters, then when income declines overdue 
debt will decline faster than the debt outstanding.  One would expect this to apply 
especially to short term debt – consumer debt, and especially to credit card debt, than 
to debt where the borrower expects to repay over many years: residential debt.  Of 
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course to examine these possible explanations in detail requires that we examine the 
time series properties of the series, and construct a multivariate model, which we do 
in the next section. 
 
4.  The Model 
We can think of the movement of the aggregate volume of debt between different 
states over time.  We could represent this movement in a conventional transition 
matrix as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Here 
Where the states are: 1= No credit, 2= Up to date, 3=30+ days over due and 4= 
Charged off and jiv , is the volume of credit which moves from state i in period t to 
state j in period t+1.  We are not assuming that jjv , remains constant over time. Let 
the period of time be one quarter.  Certain values of jiv , must necessarily take on the 
value of zero.  These are v12, v13, v14, v41, v42, v43 and v44. 
 
The change in the stock of overdue debt consists of  v23, which is the volume which 
moves from being up to date to being 30+ over due, v31 and v32, respectively the 
volume which moves from 30+ overdue to no credit or to up to date, and v34 which 
represents the volume which moves from 30+ to being charged off.  Letting dt = v23, 
pt = (v31 + v32) and ct = v34 we can write: 
ttttt cpdss −−=− − )(1  (1) 
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where st = real volume of consumer debt which is 30+ days over due in quarter t. 
 
We model delinquency rates in terms of the ability to pay hypothesis and, for loans on 
residential real estate, we include a variable to represent the strategic default 
hypothesis.  Thus we assume that the volume of debt which is 30+ days overdue at the 
end of a quarter is correlated with the levels of nominal interest rates (ri), the volume 
of debt outstanding, (ccout), personal disposable income, (pdi), and expectations 
about future income during that period.  The interest rate and level of disposable 
income affect the ability of a borrower to repay and so the aggregate number of 
borrowers who default.  Expectations of higher future income may lead a borrower to 
wish to borrow more now and in the future and so he will not wish to risk his ability 
to do this by missing payments.  For real estate loans we included the level of real 
house prices (rhp), the argument being that if house prices are low, controlling for the 
level of debt outstanding, the greater the proportion of borrowers for whom the value 
of the debt exceeds the value of the property plus transactions costs, and the greater 
the advantage of default, assuming the lender does not continue to pursue the debtor. 
 
These arguments imply that the change in the stock of overdue debt, the levels of 
ttt cpd −− )( , are correlated with changes in these explanatory variables.  A rise  
interest rates or a reduction in disposable income, which at the level of a borrower 
could be the result of a catastrophe such as job loss or marital break-up, when 
aggregated across borrowers would be expected to result in an increase in aggregate 
volume of overdue debt. 
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We assume the long-run relationship between the stock of overdue debt and its 
determinants is linear, thus we write 
tt
T
ts εδ ++= xδ  (2) 
Where x  is a vector of covariates and δ  and δ are a scalar and a matrix of parameters 
to be estimated, respectively. tε  represents an error term. 
Estimation 
The vector error correction representation of equation (2) is 
          12111 tt
T
tt
T
t ss εδθ +−−+=∆ −−− )( xδΔxβ  (3) 
where β and θ  are a matrix and a scalar respectively and are to be estimated. Engle 
and Granger showed that if variables in the xt vector, and st, are integrated order 1 and 
if a cointegrating vector exists then there is a vector error correction representation of 
the model, of which equation (3) is an example, where tε  is white noise.  The 
expression in brackets in equation (3), the error correction mechanism, represents the 
deviation of St from its long-run value of 121 −+ t
T xδδ .  Equation 3 could be rewritten 
and estimated as an autoregressive distributed lag model or estimated as a vector error 
correction model (VEC) and in principle both sets of estimated structural parameters 
should be the same (Patterson 2000).  Because it revealed more information overtly 
we chose to estimate the VEC form.  We therefore tested all of the variables for the 
order of integration and, finding them to be I(1), except for the mortgage interest rate, 
we proceeded to estimate the long-run relationship using Johansen cointegrating ML 
procedure and then to estimate the ECM representation (Johansen (1988)). 
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In general, having estimated the cointegrating relationship using equation 3 with 
several lags, we then estimated the short-run dynamic model: 
( )
( )[ ]t-ltttt
l
l
ltl
l
lt
l
llt
l
llt
l
l
l
ltl
l
ltlt
rhpoptimismccoutris
hpuet
optimismccoutpdiriss
)
))
6151412111
l-t
4
0
6
4
0
5
4
0
4
4
0
3
4
0
2
4
0
1
4
1
0
(
((
δδδδδθ
ββ
βββββα
−−−−−
+∆+∆
+∆+∆+∆+∆+∆+=∆
−−−−
=−=
−
=
−
=
−
==
−
=
−
∑∑
∑∑∑∑∑
 (4)
 
Here we assumed the variables in the xt vector were weakly exogenous and so 
included as ∆x t terms.  To allow for more distant changes to affect the short-run 
dynamics of the model we included the first differences in the ri, pdi, ccout, nominal 
house prices (hp), the unemployment rate (uet) and optimism variables to be lagged 
up to four quarters and then tested down to a parsimonious form.  The variables in the 
cointegrating vector were selected to accord with reasonable a priori predictions.  
These were that (a) it would seem implausible that at higher levels of interest rates 
delinquency would be lower and (b) higher consumer debt outstanding would result in 
higher delinquency. Disposable income is omitted from equation (4) for reasons we 
give in the next section. 
 
5.  Results 
The data for the volume of overdue debt on consumer loans to commercial banks was 
estimated from the delinquency rates published on the FRB website.  For total 
consumer loans the delinquency rate was multiplied by the volume of consumer loans, 
both seasonally unadjusted, and then was seasonally adjusted using the Stats Canada 
X12 routine.  All of the variables were seasonally adjusted using X12 unless only 
seasonally adjusted values were available.  The natural logs of all variables were then 
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used.  Unfortunately because of lack of data on the corresponding amounts of debt 
outstanding on credit cards, residential mortgages or other consumer loans our 
dependent variables for these types of loans is the delinquency rate.  We could not 
find an interest rate for each separate type of loan for the entire period of our data.  
We were able to find data for credit card interest rates, mortgage interest rates and the 
mean rate for 24 month personal loans. 
 
We first checked to see if the variables were stationary using a Phillips-Perron test.  
We assumed a time trend for levels but not for first differences.  The results are 
shown in Table 2.  From this it can be seen that all variables were integrated order 1, 
except for the mortgage rate, and so their first differences were stationary. The results 
of the  Phillips-Perron test for mortgage interest rate varied according to the time span 
of data that was used. For example, it suggested that the mortgage rate was I(0) if one 
used the entire data series available to us (up to 2009 Q1). But if we used just up until 
2008Q1 the test suggested mortgage interest rate was I(1). We chose to include 
mortgage interest rate in the ECM since the tests we use for a cointegrating vector 
would indicate no vector if the mortgage rate was not integrated order 1. The 
cointegrating vector and the short run dynamic models were estimated using the 
following data periods: volume of consumer credit: 1988 Q2 – 2008 Q1, and default 
rates for credit cards, other consumer loans and loans on real estate: 1992 Q2-2008 
Q1. The difference in the beginning date was due to data availability. We omitted 
2008Q2-2009Q1 from the estimation sample so we could use it to assess the 
forecasting accuracy of the model. 
Table 2 Here 
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Because different hypotheses may explain delinquency for different types of loans: 
credit card loans, other loans and loans on real estate we considered delinquency 
behaviour for each type of loan separately. 
 
5.1.  Volume of Consumer Credit 
Table 3 shows the results of the Johansen cointegration tests.  For the volume of 
delinquent consumer debt we excluded disposable income from the long-run model 
because when included the Trace and Eigenvalue statistics rejected the null that there 
exists at least one cointegrating vector or the elasticities on income or other variables 
were implausible.  The top panel shows both the Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue 
statistics for the included variables and they reject the hypothesis of at most zero 
cointegrating relationships but not that there is at most one.  We conclude that there is 
only one cointegrating relationship.  Table 4 column 2 shows this relationship 
normalised on the volume of delinquent debt.  Since the values are all in logs (except 
the trend) the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities.  The relationship shows 
that in the long-run, ceteris paribus, the higher is the nominal personal loan interest 
rate and/or the volume of consumer debt the greater is the volume of consumer debt 
that is 30+ days overdue.  The asymptotic t-statistics suggest both are statistically 
significant.  The delinquency elasticity of the volume of debt in equilibrium at 2.48 is 
somewhat lower than for nominal interest rates at 3.42. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 show the short-run dynamic equation after variables have 
been removed on the basis of t-statistics and a priori expectations and assuming all of 
the independent variables are weakly exogenous in explaining the volume of 
delinquent debt.  The error correction term is highly significant and negative meaning 
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that the greater the amount by which the volume of debt in default exceeds its long-
run value in one quarter, the larger the decrease in delinquent debt in the next quarter, 
which is consistent with our expectations.  The value implies that only 13.7% of the 
deviation of delinquent debt from its equilibrium value is removed in the next period. 
 
Table 3 Here 
Table 4 Here 
Table 5 Here 
 
Considering aggregate explanations, these results are consistent with credit quality 
explanation (increases in credit volume tends to be gained by accepting higher risk 
borrowers) but lend little support to the stigma hypothesis. Considering the long run 
relationship one would expect the positive marginal effect of the volume of consumer 
debt outstanding (conditional on personal loan interest rate) if the default rate was 
constant, but the elasticity of 2.48 indicates that the volume of delinquent would 
increase at a faster rate than the volume of consumer debt implying an increase in the 
default rate with an increase in consumer debt. The credit quality argument is also 
supported by the positive effect of the personal loan rate because at higher interest 
rates the proportion of applicants that are high risk is expected to be higher due to 
adverse selection. (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) The insignificance of the trend variable is 
not consistent with the stigma hypothesis. The short run results add support to this 
interpretation. The greater the increase in consumer debt the greater is the increase in 
delinquent volume. 
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Turning to explanations at the level of the household, the results support all three 
hypotheses. The irrationality (irrationally borrowing debt that cannot be repaid) 
receives support from the magnitude of the elasticity on the level of debt outstanding 
and the positive sign on the change in debt in the short run equation. It is also 
supported by the negative sign on the lagged interest rate term. This suggests that the 
greater the decrease in the rate the greater the volume of delinquent debt one quarter 
later which is consistent with households irrationally, possibly because of hyperbolic 
discounting,  reacting to the decline in the rate and taking on more debt than they can 
repay. The adverse shock hypothesis gains support form the positive sign on the 
personal loan interest rate: at higher levels of this rate the volume of delinquent debt 
is higher and from the elasticity on the volume of debt. Further support is given by the 
short run dynamic models where we found that a greater increase in the loan interest 
rate results in a greater increase in delinquency volume  in the same quarter and the 
larger the fall in  households’ expected financial situation relative to their current 
situation  the greater the increase in delinquency volume. The strategic hypothesis is 
consistent with the sign in the short run equation on the change in nominal house 
prices: the greater the fall in house prices the greater the increase in delinquent debt. 
 
Figure 2 shows the observed and predicted volumes of overdue consumer debt.  
Within sample the model predicts relatively poorly in quarters 1 of 1993, the fourth 
quarter of 2003 and second quarter 2006, when in all three cases predicted values are 
much smaller than those observed and also in quarters 3 and 4 of 1993 when the 
predicted values are much larger than that observed. We now turn to delinquency 
rates. 
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Figure 2 Here 
 
5.2.  Delinquency Rates 
We modelled the delinquency rates for two types of consumer loans separately: credit 
card loans and other consumer loans.  These together make up total consumer loans – 
the variable corresponding to the volume of delinquent consumer debt in the last 
section.  Due to data restrictions we were unable to model the volume of delinquent 
debt in each category.  Instead the dependent variables were the volume of debt 30+ 
days overdue as a percentage of end-of-quarter debt outstanding.  The model followed 
the corresponding assumptions to those above. 
Credit Card Delinquency Rates 
Table 3 panel 2 shows the results of the Johansen cointegration tests for the credit 
card delinquency rate.  We excluded real disposable income because when we 
experimented with it we found either no cointegrating relationship or that the implied 
elasticities on income or on other variables were implausibly high or of an 
implausible sign. Both the Trace statistic and the Max Eigenvalue test suggest we can 
reject the null of no cointegrating vectors, but not the null that at most 1 vector exists. 
We conclude at there is one vector and the parameters of the vector, normalised of 
delinquency rate, are shown in Table 4 column 3. 
 
Considering aggregate explanations first, the long run relationships again support the 
credit quality explanation. The mean credit card interest rate and the volume of total 
household debt outstanding are both positively related to the default rate. There is no 
support for the stigma hypothesis with the effect of the trend (conditional on interest 
rate and debt outstanding) being negative. 
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Looking at household level explanations, the results give support to two hypotheses 
but not the strategic default hypothesis.  The irrational behaviour hypothesis gains 
support from the large and positive elasticity on household debt outstanding in the 
long run equation and by the negative sign on the lagged interest rate in the short run 
equation, the latter indicating that the greater the reduction in the interest rate the 
greater the increase in delinquency rate two quarters later. The adverse shock 
hypothesis is supported by the positive effect of interest rates in the long run and the 
one period lagged positive effect of a change in credit card interest rates on the 
increase in default rate in the following quarter. The lagged effect of increased 
unemployment also is consistent with the adverse shock explanation; the greater is the 
increase in unemployment rate in one quarter the greater the increase in delinquency 
two quarters later. Similarly the lagged effect of an increase in income resulting 9 
months later in a decrease in delinquency rate is also consistent although the effect 
takes rather a long time. The argument that households miss a payment on their credit 
card because they have negative net equity in their house receives no support since the 
effect of house prices was insignificant in either of the long run or the short run 
models. This is entirely plausible since one would expect this hypothesis to apply only 
to secured lending. 
 
The size of the adjustment coefficient on the cointegrating vector, –0.138 is similar to 
that for the volume of consumer debt equation 
 
Other Consumer Debt Delinquency Rates 
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For other consumer loans the interest rate used was the 24 month personal loan 
interest rate.  The cointegration tests are shown in Table 3 panel 3 and agree that there 
is one cointegrating relationship.  Following normalisation on delinquency rate, the 
estimated cointegrating vector for delinquency rates on other consumer loans is given 
in Table 4 column 4. 
 
Neither of the aggregate explanations gain support from the long run equations.   Of 
the household level explanations there is support for the adverse shock hypothesis 
provided by the lagged positive sign on the person loan rate and the negative sign on 
real disposable income. The negative sign on real house prices is consistent with the 
strategic default hypothesis and makes sense if asset prices move consistently, so that 
house prices are reflecting the value of assets bought with these loans. 
 
6.  Residential Real Estate Loans 
When estimating the cointegrating vector for residential loans we included a fixed rate 
mortgage interest rate because the vast majority of first lien primary mortgages are 
fixed rate.  For example Buck et al, using the  Survey of Consumer Finance, found 
that only 15% of those with a first lien primary mortgage had one with an adjustable 
interest rate in 2004 and only 11% in 2001 (Buck et al : 2006). We experimented with 
the inclusion of real personal disposable income, but when included it yielded 
implausibly signs or elasticities on income or other variables or few variables that 
were significant . We subsequently obtained two cointegrating relationships, as shown 
in Table 3 panel 4. We normalise the first on the delinquency rate and second on 
residential real estate debt and obtain the results shown in Table 4, column 5. 
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These results support the stigma explanation of Gross and Souleles (op cit) for 
delinquency; conditional on the mortgage interest rate, real house prices and 
sentiment, the trend in delinquency was upwards over the 1990s and 2000s.  Evidence 
in favour of the credit quality argument is provided by the strong positive effect of the 
level of the mortgage rate on the level of delinquency in the long run equation  and in 
the positive effect of the increase in the mortgage rate on the increase in delinquency 
rate in the short run equation. Since we use the fixed rate interest rate changes in this 
are unlikely to affect current borrowers, but it would affect new borrowers who, if 
offered relatively high rates and accept such rates, may subsequently find they are less 
able to repay than were borrowers who accepted lower rates. In short, poorer quality 
applicants have been accepted with banks charging higher margins to cover increased 
risk. The positive conditional trend effect is also consistent with a credit quality 
effect. Notice that our results relate to the long run over many years and not merely to 
the period of the recent crisis. 
 
All three household level hypotheses are supported. The adverse shock hypothesis is 
supported by the effect of changes in disposable income on the changes in 
delinquency from the short run equations.  The irrationality hypothesis is supported 
by the positive sign on the level of the mortgage rate and on the increase in the 
mortgage rate in the short run equation. Because we are using the fixed rate mortgage 
interest rate a change in this rate would be unlikely to affect a significant proportion 
of current borrowers, but it would mean that new borrowers were accepting higher 
rates than previous borrowers and then missing a payment. This is consistent with the 
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irrationality hypothesis. The strategic default hypothesis is supported by the short run 
negative effect of lagged changes in house prices. 
Table 6 Here 
The adjustment coefficients suggest that just 10.6% of the deviation of the 
delinquency rate from its long-run path is corrected for in a quarter.  Comparison with 
Table 4 shows this to be lower than for credit card delinquency and lower than for 
other consumer loans.  This is consistent with homeowners trying to maintain real 
credit card repayments rather than real estate repayments in the short term if the short 
term equilibrium default rate increases to be above the long run equilibrium rate.  One 
explanation is that the payments that are missed on a mortgage are likely to be much 
larger than for credit cards and so the former are less easily restored to their scheduled 
level from a given income. Another is that there are readily available substitutes for 
buying a home, for example renting, but fewer substitutes for credit cards for many 
types of expenditures, although this may involve losing equity. 
 
Figure 3 shows the observed and predicted changes in default rates for residential 
loans.  Clearly the model underestimates the size of the increase in the third quarter of 
1999 and over predicts in the next quarter, and it predicts the rise in quarter 1 2005 
which is one quarter early. It also under predicts in quarter 5 2002 and over predicts in 
quarter 3 2003. Notice that the model fits the data no less well after 2004 quarter 4, 
when the default rate began to rise rapidly, than before. 
 
Figure 3 Here 
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7. Forecasting Performance 
In this section we examine the effects of shocks to the independent variables on the 
volume of delinquent consumer debt and we compare the accuracy of forecasts 
derived from the short-run dynamic model with those given by benchmark ARIMA 
models.  We consider only the volume of delinquency consumer debt because this is 
the only type of debt for which the volume of delinquent debt could be calculated. 
 
Table 7 describes the values of the variables and indicates the shock to be applied to 
each in turn.  The shock is typically set to roughly one standard deviation of the 
variable.  The simulation starts from a situation where all variables are constant at 
their average values, the trend variable is constant at the value that makes these 
average values consistent with long-run equilibrium.  Each variable in turn is raised 
by the amount of the shock and held at that higher value indefinitely.  Figure 4 plots 
the cumulative response over 24 quarters. 
Table 7 Here 
All of the four independent variables are near their long-run cumulative impact within 
12 quarters.  Most do not move monotonically reflecting perhaps some disorientation 
and transitional financial adjustments that follow the shock. The impacts shown in 
Figure 4 shed further light on the plausibility of explanations for changes in 
delinquency. The impact of increased outstanding debt is consistent with the credit 
quality explanation of aggregate delinquency. At the level of household explanations 
the adverse income shock explanation is consistent with the immediate and persistent 
increase in delinquency volume when interest rates rise. It is also consistent with the 
impact of a shock to the unemployment rate which leads to no changes in delinquency 
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volume over the first three months, perhaps whilst households are dissaving to fund 
repayments, but a dramatic increase in delinquency thereafter. The irrationality 
hypothesis is supported by the impact of a shock to optimism, which after three 
months results in ever increased delinquency, perhaps as households irrationally take 
on more debt. The strategic default hypothesis is supported by the impact of the 
positive shock to house prices that results in an immediate fall in delinquency volume, 
followed by a n increase back to the original level as households adjust to the new 
levels. 
Figure 4 Here 
The experience of credit repayment behaviour reflects the joint impact of ongoing 
shocks to all independent variables, and each shock response will occur before the 
response to previous shocks has been exhausted.  Figure 2 demonstrates the model’s 
success in coordinating these influences to track delinquency developments well and 
in so doing gives credibility to the predicted responses to individual variables.  The 
comprehensiveness of the model in doing so is indicated not only by the modest 
magnitude of its tracking errors, but in the absence of evident pattern in these errors. 
 
Figure 5 compares the in-sample tracking properties of the regression model with that 
of an ARIMA model, including also account of ex-sample forecasts by both models.  
Regression models are often valued for their analytical facilities in spite of inferior 
forecasting performance to simple models that have little explanatory content, but 
which manage to extrapolate well the trends and cycles in a dependent variable’s 
behaviour.  Regression models are handicapped by the need to use forecasts of the 
independent variables in ex-sample prediction, and thereby depend on forecast errors 
of the independent variables to be small or to cancel.  In order to assess the extent of 
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this handicap our model estimation excluded a holdout sample of observations for 
2008 Q2 to 2009 Q1.  In this four-quarter period the model will have access to actual 
observations only to the extent that it is fitting lagged variables observed before the 
holdout period.  Current observations and those with short lags eventually require 
resort to forecast values.  Table 8 indicates the ARIMA models used to forecast the 
independent variables.  ARIMA models for the dependent variable establish a 
benchmark performance against which the regression model can be assessed. 
Figure 5 Here 
In general the ARIMA models reported in Table 8 reflect suitable parsimony with 
respect to numbers of estimated coefficients, but occasionally marginally insignificant 
parameters are adopted as well in order to achieve a suitably impressive ACF.  To the 
extent that missed parsimony causes suboptimal forecasts of independent variables 
regression model forecasts will tend to appear in a poorer light compared to 
benchmark forecasts. 
Table 8 Here 
Table 9 reports ex-sample forecast performance for the regression model and its two 
benchmark competitors.  These are m-step ahead forecasts that make no use of data 
observed in the ex-sample period.  Wherever an ex-sample observation is needed of a 
forecast, relevant forecasts are used.  For lagged independent variables in regression 
forecasts the regression forecasts are used, and for other independent variables the 
relevant ARIMA forecast is used. 
Table 9 Here 
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Not surprisingly, the model’s ex-sample performance has failed to achieve anything 
like the promise indicated by its in-sample performance.  However the delinquency 
volume regression model roughly matches ex-sample performance achieved by the 
corresponding ARIMA model. 
 
The present model that explains real estate loan delinquency rates is particularly 
interesting, because toxic real estate credit appears at the heart of the current global 
financial crisis.  Figure 6 demonstrates that this model forecasts such delinquency 
quite well even into the holdout period, following its considerable acceleration well 
into that period. 
Figure 6 Here 
One might expect such fidelity of model performance to reflect simple appreciation of 
the extent that real estate credit has been radically over-extended in recent years, but 
that in fact is not so evident.  There is a large and significant coefficient on the error 
correction vector for outstanding real estate debt, indicating that delinquency will be 
profoundly influenced by such debt being extended beyond equilibrium levels.  
However, Figure 7 suggests that the mechanism is perhaps not so simple.  That figure 
does indicate debt levels persistently above equilibrium levels in recent years, but the 
relative magnitude of excess seems modest and stable. 
Figure 7 Here 
That the delinquency crisis reflects home purchase by people borrowing beyond their 
means can hardly be doubted, but the model suggests that the influence of income is a 
short-term dynamic phenomenon.  There is no income variable in the cointegrating 
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vector concerning mortgage debt outstanding, and that reflects an absence of long-run 
income relationship beyond what can be accounted for by proxy variables such as the 
trend and house prices.  The more influential feature of the model is the small yet very 
significant coefficient on the error correction vector for real estate loan delinquency 
itself.  Figure 8 indicates that the delinquency rate is well out of equilibrium and the 
model suggests that it will continue to grope upward for it for a while to come, unless 
there are intervening shocks in the meantime. 
Figure 8 Here 
8.  Conclusion 
We have found evidence of a long-run relationship between the volume of delinquent 
consumer credit and the volume of consumer debt outstanding and the interest rate on 
personal loans.  We have also found long-run relationships between delinquency  
rates for credit cards, and a credit card interest rate and the level of household debt 
and between delinquency rates for other debt and an index of household optimism. 
We also found a relationship between default rates on residential real estate loans, and 
the mortgage rate and real house price index 
 
These findings suggest that different explanations of delinquency are appropriate for 
different types of debt. For the volume of consumer debt variations in the quality of 
debt, but not changes in the stigma of default appear to drive delinquent volume and 
at the level of the household irrationality, adverse income shocks and changes in 
house prices are all at work. Decomposing consumer debt into debt on credit cards 
and that on other consumer loans we find evidence that the quality of debt and averse 
shocks apply but not negative equity, whereas for other consumer loans it is only 
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strategic delinquency that applies which is plausible because credit card loans do not 
involve collateral whilst other loans often do. For real state loans we find that both 
explanations of delinquency apply as do all household level explanations. 
 
These results are not consistent with Gross and Souleles (2002 ) who fund evidence of 
reduced stigma in the case of credit cards. Our results are only partly consistent with 
Grieb et al ( 2001); whilst we find evidence of the adverse shock hypothesis we do not 
find that high interest rates, higher debt and unemployment significantly affect 
delinquency. 
 
We also found that the error correction model gave comparably accurate forecasts of 
the volume of delinquent debt as did an ARIMA model. 
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Footnotes 
 
1. More realistically, if transactions costs do exist and default does reduce the chance 
of a borrower gaining future loans, the option to default will not be exercised until the 
debt is somewhat greater than the asset value because default removes the option to 
default or repay in the future (Kau et al 1994). Lambrecht et al (1997) point out that 
for some the costs of default are higher than for others.  For example those to whom 
access to debt is particularly important will experience a higher cost if default reduces 
the chance of borrowing in the future.  According to the Permanent Income 
Hypothesis these are individuals who expect their income to rise in the future (Deaton 
1992).  Note also that unlike a Chapter 7 bankruptcy declaration in the United Sates, a 
default in some countries, for example the UK, does not prevent creditors pursuing for 
the debtor for repayment.  In such countries this latter point removes the reason for 
strategic default. 
 
2. The delinquency rate is the value of loans 30+ days overdue as a percentage of debt 
outstanding at the end of the quarter; the charge off rate is “are the value of loans 
removed from the books and charged against loss reserves, are measured net of 
recoveries as a percentage of average loans and annualized” (FRB). 
 
3. The delinquency rates were seasonally adjusted by the authors using X12. The 
charge off figures were adjusted by the FRB. 
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Definitions of variables 
Lnrdelsa log of (real consumer loan debt outstanding on loans to US chartered 
commercial banks which is 30+ days over due, in $00 millions at year  
at year 2000 prices). 
Sources of raw data: Charge off and delinquency rates on loans and 
leases at commercial banks, Consumer loans: All. and Series G19 
Consumer Credit debt outstanding to commercial banks.  All series 
from FRB. 
Seasonally adjusted by authors using X12,. 
Lnccsa log of (consumer credit card debt to US chartered commercial banks 
which is 30+ days over due as a percentage of end of period 
corresponding debt outstanding). 
Sources of raw data: Charge off and delinquency rates on loans and 
leases at commercial banks , Consumer loans: Credit Cards, FRB. 
Seasonally adjusted by authors using X12. 
Lnosa log of (consumer non-credit card debt to US chartered commercial 
banks which is 30+ days over due as a percentage of end-of-period 
corresponding debt outstanding). 
Sources of raw data: Charge off and delinquency rates on loans and 
leases at commercial banks, Consumer loans: Other, FRB. 
Seasonally adjusted by authors using X12. 
Lnrnsa log of (single family residential mortgage debt (including home equity 
loans) to US chartered commercial banks which is 30+ days over due 
as a percentage of end-of-period corresponding debt outstanding). 
Sources of raw data: Charge off and delinquency rates on loans and 
leases at commercial banks, Real Estate Loans: Residential, FRB. 
Seasonally adjusted by authors using X12. 
Lninsa log of (nominal interest rate on 24 month personal loan). 
Source of raw data: Terms of Credit, Consumer Credit Historical 
Data, FRB. 
Seasonally adjusted by the authors using X12. 
Lnrccoutsa log of (sum of revolving and non-revolving consumer credit 
outstanding to commercial banks in $00 millions divided by price 
index personal consumption expenditure seasonally adjusted 
(2000=100)). 
Sources of raw data: FRB Historical Consumer Credit Data, Major 
Types of Credit and Bureau of Economic Analysis, Price Indices for 
Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product Table 
2.3.4. 
Numerator seasonally adjusted by the authors using X12. 
Lnrpdisa log of (disposable personal income (in $00 million) seasonally adjusted 
divided by price index personal consumption expenditure seasonally 
adjusted (2000=100)). Sources of raw data: Price Indices for Personal 
Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product, Table 2.3.4 and 
Personal Income and its Disposition, Table 2.1, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
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Lnsent log of index of relative expected change in financial situation in one 
year’s time relative sentiment. Source: Index of Consumer Sentiment, 
Table 6 Expected Change in Financial Situation, Index of Sentiment, 
Surveys of Consumers, Institute for Social Research, University of 
Michigan. 
Seasonally adjusted by the authors using X12. 
Lnhpisa log of (US combined house price index seasonally adjusted). 
Sources of raw data: OFHEO House price index, US Combined Index: 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Office. 
OFHEO House price index seasonally adjusted by the authors using 
X12. 
Lnrhpisa log of (US combined house price index seasonally adjusted / price 
index personal consumption expenditure seasonally adjusted 
(2000=100)). 
Sources of raw data: OFHEO House price index, US Combined Index: 
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight Office; Price Indices 
for Personal Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product, 
Table  2.3.4, Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
OFHEO House price index seasonally adjusted by the authors using 
X12. 
Lnrnoutsa log of (real estate loans outstanding to Commercial Banks /price 
index). 
Source: Series bcablcr_ba.m, Federal Reserve Board. Numerator 
seasonally adjusted by the authors using X12. 
Lnmisa log of (nominal interest rate on conventional conforming 30 year fixed 
rate mortgages). 
Source: Primary Mortgage Market Survey, Freddie Mac. 
  Seasonally adjusted by the authors using X12. 
Lnccinsa log of (nominal credit card interest rate). 
Source: Consumer Credit G19, Terms of Credit, Federal Reserve 
Board. 
  Seasonally adjusted by the authors using X12. 
Lndsrsa Log of (debt service ratio). (Ratio of household debt payments to 
disposable personal income). 
Source: Federal Reserve Board. 
Seasonally adjusted by FRB. 
Lnrtdoutsa Log of (total credit market debt owed by household sector seasonally 
adjusted divided by price index personal consumption expenditure 
seasonally adjusted (2000=100)). 
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United 
States,  Outstandings, file ltab1d.prn, series FL154102005.Q and 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, Price Indices for Personal 
Consumption Expenditures by Major Type of Product Table 2.3.4. 
Numerator seasonally adjusted by the authors using X12. 
All seasonal adjustments performed before logs were taken. 
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Figure 1: US Seasonally adjusted delinquency rates (30+ days overdue) and 
charge-off rates for different loan types 
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Figure 2:  Changes in log volume of delinquent credit. 
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Figure 3: Changes in log default rates for residential loans. 
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Figure 4: Cumulative impact ($ million) to volume of credit delinquency from 
various shocks in independent variables over 24 quarters. 
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Figure 5: Tracking of alternative models for delinquency volume. 
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Figure 6: Tracking of alternative models for real estate loan delinquency rate. 
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Figure 7: Observed and equilibrium real estate loans outstanding ($ million) 
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Figure 8: Observed and equilibrium real estate loan delinquency rates 
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Table 1:  Repayments Transition Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 
1 v11 v12 v13 v14 
2 v21 v22 v23 v24 
3 v31 v32 v33 v34 
4 v41 v42 v43 v44 
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Table 2:  Phillips-Perron Unit Root Tests 
  Levels Adjusted  Differences Adjusted  
  (with trend) t-statistic  (without trend) t-statistic  
  
Consumer delinquency types:       
 real bank consumer credit total Lnrdelsa -1.067  dlnrdelsa -5.569**  
 bank credit card Lnccsa -1.143  dlnccsa -5.763**  
 other bank consumer credit Lnosa -1.198  dlnosa -5.154**  
 mortgage loan Lnrnsa 3.462  dlnrnsa -3.914**  
 
Explanatory variables 
real real estate credit 
outstanding                                                    Lnrnoutsa     -0.971           
 
real consumer credit 
outstanding Lnrccoutsa -1.979  dlnrccoutsa -6.579**  
 personal loan interest rate Lninsa -2.782  dlninsa -8.607**  
 consumer sentiment index Lnsent -1.958  dlnsent -12.984**  
 real personal disposable income Lnrpdisa -2.125  dlnpdisa -13.134**  
 real house price index Lnrhpisa 1.666  dlnrhpisa -4.250**  
 
real real estate credit 
outstanding Lnrnoutsa -0.971  dlnrnoutsa -7.213**  
 mortgage interest rate Lnmisa -3.578*  dlnmisa -9.848**  
 real total household debt Lnrtdoutsa -1.466  dlnrtdoutsa -3.494*  
 credit card interest rate Lnccintsa -2.494  dlnccintsa -6.964**  
Test period:  1987Q1 - 2009Q1 for all variables except for the consumer sentiment index for 
which it is 1987Q1 - 2008Q4 because Q1 2009 data was not available. 
* = significant at 5% one sided test (MacKinnon) 
** = significant at 1% one sided test (MacKinnon) 
In all cases bandwidth 4 (Newey-West using Bartlett Kernel) 
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Table 3:  Johansen Cointegration Tests 
   Trace   Max-Eigenvalue   
 H0:  Statistic 5% cv  Statistic 5% cv  
  Consumer Credit       
  
Total real default volume 
(Lnrdelsa)   
 
Ref: citestlnrdelsa1 
 r = 0  75.65 63.88  36.10 32.12  
 r ≤ 1  39.56 42.92  20.39 25.82  
 r ≤ 2  19.17 25.87  16.69 19.39  
 r ≤ 3  2.48 12.52  2.48 12.52  
  Lags in ECM = 4       
  Credit card default rate (Lnccsa)    Ref: citestlnccsa24 
 r = 0  66.28 63.88  37.02 32.12  
 r ≤ 1  29.27 42.92  14.43 25.82  
 r ≤ 2  14.83 25.87  10.24 19.39  
 r ≤ 3  4.59 12.52  4.59 12.52  
  Lags in ECM = 4       
  Other loans Default rate (Lnosa)    Ref: citestlnosa5 
 r = 0  80.52 63.88  44.21 32.12  
 r ≤ 1  36.31 42.92  16.02 25.82  
 r ≤ 2  20.29 25.87  13.83 19.39  
 r ≤ 3  6.46 12.52  6.46 12.52  
  Lags in ECM = 4       
  Residential Real Estate Loans        
  Default rate (Lnrnsa)    Ref: citestlnrnsa12 
 r = 0  119.78 88.80  41.01 38.33  
 r ≤ 1  78.77 63.88  35.45 32.11  
 r ≤ 2  43.32 42.92  22.71 25.82  
 r ≤ 3  20.61 25.87  10.91 19.39  
 r ≤ 4  9.71 12.52  9.71 12.52  
  Lags in ECM = 4       
 
The estimation samples for the models were: volume of consumer credit: 1988Q2-2008Q1; for 
delinquency rates for credit cards, other consumer loans and residential real estate loans: 1992Q2-
2009Q1. 
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Table 4:  Cointegrating vectors (normalized) 
 Dependent variable Consumer credit Residential Residential  
 (delinquency rates   Total real Credit cards Other real estate real estate  
 or volume)  volume rate rate rate debt  
   (lnrdelsa) (lnccsa) (lnosa) (lnrnsa) (lnrnoutsa)  
 Estimation Period:  
1988(2) -
2008(1) 
1992(2) -
2008(1) 
1992(2) - 
2008(1) 
1992(2) - 
2008(1) 
1992(2) - 
2008(1)  
 Independent variables       
 personal loan  lninsa 3.421179  .224736    
 interest rate  (5.138)** (.895)    
 credit card  lnccintsa  1.052104     
 interest rate   (2.440)**     
 mortgage  lnminsa    4.440855 -.058910  
 interest rate     (4.814)** (-.379)  
 
real consumer 
credit  lnrccoutsa 2.476919    
 
 
 outstanding  (6.560)**     
 real total household  Lnrtdoutsa  3.293867 .326231    
 debt outstanding   (3.703)** (.850)    
 real house price lnrhpisa    -1.287682 .819381  
 index     (-.828) (3.128)**  
 consumer  lnsent .250140 4.149131 2.637235 -1.217450 .005718  
 sentiment index  (.772) (5.550)** (7.538)** (-.579) (-.016)  
  Trend .000646 -.042407 -.005393 .057898 .012822  
   (.353) (-3.046)** (-.860) (3.135)** (4.123)**  
  Constant -32.96678 -71.12901 -17.22614 2.02118 2.298972  
  Ref: civecmlnrdelsa1 civecmlnccsa24 civecmlnosa5 civecmlnrnsa12 civecmlnrnsa12 
Asymptotic t statistics in parentheses.  * = significance at 5%; ** = significance at 1% 
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Table 5:  Short run dynamic equations 
 Dependent Variable: dlnrdelsa  dlnccsa  dlnosa   
 Estimation Period: 1988(2) - 2008(1)  1992(2) - 2008(1)  1992(2) - 2008(1)   
  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat  Coefficient t-stat   
 Independent Variable           
 Constant .006963 1.904 .063755 4.034 ** .036956 5.693 **  
 ∆dependent variable           
 ddepvar(-1) .294305 3.269 ** .277482 2.544 * .292584 3.222 **  
 ddepvar(-2)    .409872 4.321 **     
 ddepvar(-3) -.178716 -2.039 *    .272562 2.868 **  
 ddepvar(-4) .191735 2.850 **        
 ∆personal loan int. rate        
 dlninsa .247647 2.061 *        
 dlninsa(-1) -.318031 -2.230 *        
 dlninsa(-2)       .398035 2.371 *  
 dlninsa(-4) -.283033 -1.928        
 ∆credit card int. rate           
 dlnccisa(-1)    .995690 4.382 **     
 dlnccisa(-2)    -.459833 -1.847     
 
∆real cons. credit 
outstanding           
 dlnrccoutsa 1.769506 11.424 **        
 dlnrccoutsa(-1) -.863338 -4.234 **        
 dlnrccoutsa(-3) .332669 1.731        
 
∆real total debt 
outstanding           
 dlnrtdoutsa(-4)    -2.711368 -3.059 **     
 ∆real personal disp. inc.           
 dlnrpdisa       -.960631 -2.799 **  
 dlnrpdisa(-3)    -1.178360 -2.282 *     
 dlnrpdisa(-4)    -1.348418 -2.646 *     
 ∆(log)optimism           
 dlnsent -.167160 -2.520 *        
 dlnsent(-1)    -.580658 -3.570 **     
 dlnsent(-2) -.122058 -1.753    -.195921 -1.702  
 dlnsent(-3) -.152598 -2.070 *    -.271455 -2.294 *  
 dlnsent(-4) .141314 1.981 .288269 1.979     
 ∆unemployment rate           
 dlnuets(-2)    .310217 2.519 *     
 dlnuets(-4) .124044 1.981        
 ∆nominal house prices           
 dlnhpisa       -2.281425 -5.463 **  
 dlnhpisa(-1) -.743795 -2.887 **        
 error correction           
 ecmlnrdelsa1(-1) -.136846 -6.206 **        
 ecmlnccsa24(-1)    -.137630 -4.031 **     
 ecmlnosa5(-1)       -.155482 -4.988 **  
 Adjusted R2 .798193  .524616  .540635   
 DW 2.295758  2.111985  2.094834   
 Durbin's h alt. -.104661  -.635365  -.772350   
 Jarque-Bera χ2(2) 6.731451  .112595  6.360840   
 RESET2 χ2(1) .404732  1.117542  .004008   
 LM het. Test χ2(1) .053380  .614157  .191852   
 F-statistic 20.528973  7.320408  10.268245   
All variable changes are in logs.  * = significance at 5%; ** = significance at 1%. 
Total volume of delinquent consumer debt (lnrdelsa), consumer credit outstanding (lnrccoutsa), 
personal disposable income (lnrpdisa), and total household debt outstanding (lnrtdoutsa) are all in real 
terms. House price index (lnhpisa) is in nominal values. 
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Table 6:  Short run dynamic mortgage equation 
 Dependent Variable: Log ∆ in mortgage delinquency rate (dlnrnsa)  
 Estimation Period: 1992(2) - 2008(1)     
 Independent Variables  Coefficient t-stat   
 Constant  .042408 5.360 **  
 ∆ personal loan interest rate dlninsa(-2) .646873 2.289 *  
 ∆ mortgage interest rate dlnmisa .516384 4.831 **  
  dlnmisa(-1) -.432677 -4.569 **  
  dlnmisa(-2) -.310225 -3.202 **  
  dlnmisa(-3) -.390666 -3.665 **  
 ∆ real personal disposable income dlnrpdisa -2.401499 -4.128 **  
 ∆ real house price index dlnrhpsa(-1) -3.403896 -4.761 **  
 Error correction ecmlnrnsa12v1(-1) -.106041 -7.252 **  
  ecmlnrnsa12v2(-1) .400010 2.312 *  
 Adjusted R2  .662679   
 DW  2.232973   
 Jarque-Bera χ2(2)  2.76793   
 RESET2 χ2(1)  1.77440   
 LM het. Testχ2(1)  .002740   
All variable changes are in logs.  * = significance at 5%; ** = significance at 1%. 
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Table 7:  Summary statistics (1987 Q1 - 2008 Q1) for variables and shocks 
  Delinquency Interest Credit Sentiment Unemploy- House  
  ($ million) Rate % (rccoutsa) Index ment % Price Index  
  (rdelsa) (insa) ($ billion) (sent) (uetsa) (hpisa)  
 Minimum 12845 11.59 411750 110.37 3.93 142.11  
 Maximum 23689 15.70 670234 139.04 7.61 384.84  
 Average 17823 13.53 524853 127.23 5.46 230.25  
 Std. Dev. 2182 1.10 68808 6.34 .91 74.27  
 Shock value  1.00 70000 15.00 1.00 75.00  
 Delinquency impact:       
 Initial  321 4417 -331 0 0  
 Long-run  4983 6473 507 0 0  
 Most extreme  4987 6621 -589 442 -3805  
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Table 8:  ARMA models for first differences of log-transformed variables 
  Benchmark Model  Forecasting Models for Predictor Variables  
  Delinquency   Interest Rate  Credit  Sentiment  Unemployment  House Prices   
 Performance:    ∆ [ln(insa)]  ∆ [ln(rccoutsa)]  ∆ [ln(sentsa)]  ∆ [ln(uetsa)]  ∆ [ln(hpisa)]   
 R Squared .319977   .188680  .522937  .257891  .437084  .585216   
 Std error .031070   .017178  .011287  .027015  .029082  .005245   
 Estimates: Coeff t-stat  Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat  
 Constant:     -.00278 -2.884 ** .00497 2.317 *       .01089 3.863 **  
 AR1: -.24360 -2.247 *           .86152 8.130 **     
 AR2: -.30925 -2.711 **     .28798 2.504 *           
 AR3:        .33734 3.167 **       .61883 5.849 **  
 MA1:        -.28052 -2.388 * .24016 2.312 * .51282 3.299 ** -.62447 -5.869 **  
 MA2:     -.20841 -1.744          -.37341 -3.070 **  
 MA5:        -.24981 -1.950           
 MA11:           -.26818 -2.503 *        
 MA14:              .23904 2.246 *     
 MA18:        .36622 2.466 *           
 MA20:           -.31990 -2.635 *        
 SAR1: .47243 2.159 *     -.27847 -2.481 *           
 SAR2: -.28147 -2.153 *     -.25491 -2.191 *           
 SAR3:        -.34215 -2.809 **           
 SMA1: .63859 2.946 **  .31898 2.655 **    .38022 3.526 ** .22641 1.844     
 SMA1:     .30804 2.449 *       .35156 2.952 **     
 Box-Liung Prob:                    
 At lag24 .606536   .944222  .936595  .985520  .969858  .935956   
 Min by lag24 .493075   .265556  .671857  .718427  .870855  .850769   
Note that constants cited above are the non-zero estimated mean value for the series, not the intercept. 
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Table 9:  Comparison of regression forecasts with ARIMA benchmarks 
  "Actual"  ARIMA ARIMA  Regression Regression  
 Ex-sample Values  Forecast Errors  Forecast Errors  
 Forecasts         
 2008 Q2 24264  24094 171  23999 266  
 2008 Q3 25111  24675 436  24216 895  
 2008 Q4 29974  24865 5109  24960 5014  
 2009 Q1 33733  24832 8901  24568 9165  
 Ex-sample RMSE    5137   5244  
 In-sample RMSE    562   268  
 
 
